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GLOBAL SAVING GLUT AND HOUSING BUBBLE:  




Bernanke  maintains  that the  housing bubble stemmed from  the global  saving  glut that 
occurred in the period 1996-2006. This paper has two objectives. First, it highlights the 
limits of Bernanke’s thesis. A  theory of the financial crisis must explain two phenomena: 
the  phenomenon  of  speculation  and  the  process  of  liquidity  creation  that  can  fuel  the 
speculative demand for financial assets; Bernanke’s thesis does not offer a satisfactory 
explanation of these two phenomena. The second objective  is to present a satisfactory 
explanation of the cause of the crisis on the basis of the theories of  Wicksell, Schumpeter 





Bernanke (2005, 2007, 2010) maintains that the housing bubble that caused the financial 
crisis in 2007 stemmed from the global saving glut that occurred in the period 1996-2006. 
This  saving glut generated the liquidity that at the end of the last  century fueled   the 
dot.com bubble and then the housing bubble.  
This paper has two objectives. First, it highlights the limits of Bernanke’s thesis. A 
meaningful theory of the financial crises triggered by the bursting of a speculative bubble 
must  explain  two  phenomena:  i)  the  phenomenon  of  speculation  and  the  presence  of 
markets in which financial assets are constantly traded; ii) and the process of liquidity 
creation that can fuel the speculative demand for financial assets.
1 It will be shown that 
Bernanke’s thesis does not offer a satisfactory explanation of these two phenomena. The 
second objective of this paper is to present a satisfactory explanation of the cause of the 
crisis on the basis of the theories of economists such as Wicksell, Schumpeter and Keynes.  
The paper is divided into three parts. Bernanke’s thesis is set out in the first part, the 
second part contains a critical analysis of the global saving glut hypothesis (henceforth, 
GSG hypothesis) and in the final section an alternative explanation of the origin of the 
crisis is set out.   
 
 
                                                 
1  See  for  example:  Minsky  (1975,  1982),    Kindleberger  (1978)  ,    Galbraith  (1990),  Stiglitz  (1990),  
Brunnermeier (2008),  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).   2 
1. Saving glut and the financial crisis: Bernanke’s explanation. 
 
Bernanke sets out his theory in some papers dealing with the causes of the large increases 
in the US current account deficit between 1996 and 2006 (Bernanke 2005, 2007). This 
deficit went from 120 billion dollars in 1996, equal to 1.5% of GDP, to 640 billion dollars 
in 2004 (5.5% of GDP) to 812 billion in 2006, equal to 6.2% of GDP. 
After recalling that the current account balance corresponds to the difference between 
the savings and the investments of the domestic agents and that the financial balances of all 
countries should sum to zero, Bernanke concludes that the worsening of the US’s trade 
deficit corresponds to a growing surplus of the rest of the world with respect to the US. He 
therefore wonders whether the worsening of the US trade deficit is due to internal factors 
and in particular to a fall in savings, which was equal to 16% of GDP in 1996 and dropped 
below 14% in 2006, or whether it is a consequence of phenomena occurring outside the 
US.  
Bernanke excludes the first explanation because he does not think it is coherent with 
the significant reduction in the real interest rates in the US and in many other countries; the 
fall in saving propensities should have led to an increase in the interest rates.
2 He therefore 
concludes that the US trade deficit is caused by external factors,
3 specifically, a saving glut 
in the  developed countries in order to fund the higher pension costs, and in the Asian 
emerging countries (Bernanke 2005, p. 4). In a subsequent intervention in which also data 
from 2005 and 2006 is considered, Bernanke gives greater weight to the saving glut in the 
Asian emerging countries and in the oil -producing economies; indeed, he  comments that 
his explanation: 
 
“…takes as a key  driving force a large increase in net desired saving… in emerging-
market and oil-producing economies, a change that transformed these countries from modest 
net demanders to substantial net suppliers of funds to international capital markets. This large 
increase in the net supply of financial capital from sources outside the industrial countries is 
what, in my earlier remarks, I called the global saving glut.”  (Bernanke 2007, p. 3) 
 
To  render  this  thesis  credible,  Bernanke  specifies  the  reasons  why  the  emerging 
economies increased their propensity to save. He identifies three factors: i) the financial 
crisis that affected the Asian economies in the 1990s; ii) the increase in the price of oil; iii) 
                                                 
2 “… a downward shift in the U.S. desired saving rate all else being equal, should have led to greater pressure 
on economic resources and thus to increases, not decreases, in real interest rates” (Bernanke 2007, pp. 2-3)  
3 “…domestic factors alone do not seem to account for the large deterioration in the U.S. external balance.” 
(Bernanke 2007, p. 3)   3 
the strong growth in Chinese savings linked to the sharp increase in income.
4 According to 
this view, therefore, the saving glut in the Asian emerging economies is the cause of the 
gap between savings and investments in the US, of the  consequent increase in the trade 
deficit and the drop in real interest rates in the period 1996-2006:  
 
“The combined effect of these developments…raised desired saving relative to desired 
investment in the emerging markets, which in turn led to current account surpluses in those 
countries. But for the world as a whole, total saving must equal investment, and the sum of 
national  current  account  balances  must  be  zero.  Accordingly,  in the industrial  economies, 
realized saving rates had to fall relative to investment, and  current account deficits had to 
emerge  as  counterparts  to  the  developing  countries’  surpluses.  This  adjustment  could  be 
achieved only by declines in real interest rates (as well as increases in asset prices), as we 
observed.  The  effects  were  particularly  large  in  United  States,  perhaps  because  high 
productivity growth and deep capital markets in that country were particularly attractive to 
foreign capital.” (Bernanke 2007, p. 3) 
 
Bernanke observes that the mechanism through which the effects of the saving glut in 
Asian emerging economies is transmitted to US citizens’ saving decisions has changed 
over time; he distinguishes two phases, the first one corresponding to the period 1996-2000 
and the second one to the period 2000-2006. In the first phase, the savings accumulated in 
foreign countries flowed into the US because of the yield expectations connected with the 
information  technology  revolution.  The  inflow  of  foreign  capital  fueled  the  US  stock 
market boom at the end of the last century, and, while on the one hand this led to an 
increase  in  investments,  on  the  other  it  led  to  a  fall  in  the  saving  propensities  of  US 
families, whose wealth had increased due to the rise in the stock market.
5 In the second 
                                                 
4 “In  fact,  several  factors  appear  to  have  contributed  to  the  increase  in  the  supply  of  net  saving  from 
emerging-market countries. First, the financial crises that hit many Asian economies in the 1990s led to 
significant declines in investment in those countries… and to changes in policies –including a resistance to 
currency appreciation, the determined accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, and fiscal consolidation- 
that had the effect of promoting current account surpluses. Second, sharp increases in crude oil prices boosted 
oil  exporters’  incomes  by  more  than  those  countries  were  able  or  willing  to  increase  spending,  thereby 
leading to higher saving and current account surpluses. Finally, Chinese saving rates rose rapidly (by more 
even than investment rates);  that rise in saving was, perhaps, a result of the strong growth in incomes in the 
midst of an underdeveloped financial sector and a weak social safety net that increases the motivation for 
precautionary saving.” (Bernanke 2007, p. 3) 
5 “From about 1996 to early 2000, equity  prices played a key equilibrating role in international financial 
markets. The development and adoption of new  technologies and rising productivity in the United States –
together with the country’s long-standing advantages such as low political risk, strong property rights, and a 
good  regulatory  environment-  made  the  U.S.  economy  exceptionally  attractive  to  international  investors 
during  that  period.  Consequently,  capital  flowed  rapidly  into  the  United  States,  helping  to  fuel  large   4 
period the mechanism through which the effects of the saving glut in  Asian emerging 
economies were transmitted to the US economy changed. The stock market collapse in 
2000 halted investments in the US and, together with a high global propensity to save, 
gave rise to a saving glut which pushed interest rates down. In this second phase the drop 
in US families’ propensity to save was caused by the reduction in the interest rates rather 
than the increase in share values: 
 
“After the stock-market decline that began in March 2000, new capital investment and 
thus the demand for financing waned around the world. Yet desired global saving remained 
strong.  The  textbook  analysis  suggests  that,  with  desired  saving  outstripping  desired 
investment, the real rate of interest should fall to equilibrate the market for global saving. 
Indeed, real interest rates have been relatively low in recent years, not only in the United 
States but also abroad… The weakening of new capital investment after the drop in equity 
prices did not much change the net effect of the global saving glut on the U.S. current account. 
The transmission mechanism changed, however, as low real interest rates rather than high 
stock prices became a principal cause of lower U.S. saving.” (Bernanke 2005, p. 7) 
 
The reduction in interest rates fueled a second speculative bubble regarding housing 
prices, which created a wealth effect similar to that produced by the rise in share prices of 
technological firms and this contributed to keeping the US families’ propensity to save 
low: 
 
“In particular, during the past few years, the key asset-price effects of the global saving 
glut appear to have occurred  in the market for residential investment, as low mortgage rates 
have supported record levels of home construction and strong gains in housing prices. Indeed, 
increases in home values, together with a stock-market recovery that began in 2003, have 
recently returned the wealth-to-income ratio of U.S. households to 5.4, not far from its peak 
value of 6.2 in 1999 and above its long-run (1960-2003) average of 4.8. The expansion of U.S. 
housing wealth, much of it easily accessible to households through cash-out refinancing and 
home equity lines of credit, has kept the U.S. national saving rate low…” (Bernanke 2005, p. 
7)  
 
Bernanke thus considers the two speculative bubbles which occurred in the period 
1996-2006 as a consequence of the saving glut which affected in particular in the Asian 
                                                                                                                                                          
appreciations  in  stock  prices  and  in  the  value  of  the  dollar…higher  stock-market  wealth  increased  the 
willingness of U.S. consumers to spend on goods and services, including large quantities of imports, while 
the strong dollar made U.S imports cheap.. and export expensive.. creating a rising trade imbalance. From the 
saving-investment perspective, the U.S. current account deficit rose as capital investment increased… at the 
same time that the rapid increase in household wealth and expectations of future income gains reduced U.S. 
residents’ perceived need to save. Thus the rapid increase in the U.S. current account deficit between 1996 
and 2000 was fueled to a significant extent both by increased global saving and the greater interest on the 
part of foreigners in investing in the United States.” (Bernanke 2005, p. 6)    5 
emerging countries.
6 He used the thesis of the global saving glut (Bernanke 2010) to reply 
to those, such as Taylor (2007, 2009) who maintained instead that the housing bubble was 
the consequence  of the excessively expansionary monetary policy followed by the US 
monetary authorities in the first half of the last decade.  As is well known, Taylor (2007, 
2009) defines the characteristics of monetary policy by comparing the behaviour of the rate 
controlled by the Federal Reserve, the overnight  federal funds rate, in the period 200 0-
2006 with Taylor-rule prescribed federal fund rate.  This comparison shows that in the 
period  in  question,  the  historical  values  of  the  overnight  federal  funds  rate  were 
considerably lower than those prescribed by the  Taylor rule, and Taylor deems that this 
difference is sufficient to explain the creation of the housing bubble.   
Bernanke’s  reply  is  based  on  two  points.  In  the  first  place,  he  challenges  the 
specification of the Taylor rule which provides that the Federal Reserve sets the overnight 
federal funds rate responding to deviations between the actual inflation level and the target 
level set by the monetary authorities. Bernanke notes that the monetary authorities should 
instead set the interest rate in accordance with expected inflation rather than the actual rate 
of inflation since the rate of inflation can be influenced by accidental factors such as, for 
example, sudden increases in the price of oil-related products. If the monetary authorities 
deemed the effects of this phenomenon temporary, they would have no reason to raise the 
reference rate despite the increase in the actual rate of inflation. Bernanke (2010, p. 3) 
maintains  that  ‘…over  the  past  decade,  the  distinction  between  current  and  forecast 
inflation has been an important one’, and he shows  (Bernanke 2010, p. 4) that if the Taylor 
rule is applied using the forecast inflation values instead of the actual ones, the monetary 
policy  implemented  before  the  housing  bubble  burst  could  not  be  considered  overly 
expansionary. He further notes that housing prices did not only rise in the US but in many 
other industrialised countries and therefore he concludes that if the monetary policy really 
was a determining factor in explaining the dynamics of housing prices, the countries that 
adopted  more  expansionary  monetary  policies  should  have  registered  higher  rates  of 
property price increases. The data regarding 20 industrialised countries shows, according 
                                                 
6 “This increased supply of saving boosted U.S. equity values during the period of the stock market  boom 
and helped the increase U.S. home values during the more recent period, as a consequence lowering U.S. 
national saving and contributing to the nation’s rising current account deficit.” (Bernanke 2005, p. 8)   6 
to Bernanke, that there is not a statistically significant relation between monetary policy 
and housing prices.
7    
The second part of the reply furnishes a different explanation for the housing bubble. 
And the explanation that Bernanke resorts to is based on the presence of a saving glut in 
Asian emerging economies; in support of this argument he notes that the data regarding 
capital inflows and the behaviour of housing prices of a series of countries show that ‘… 
countries in which current accounts worsened and capital inflows rose… had the greater 
price appreciation in the period.” (Bernanke 2010, p. 7)     
 
 
2. The limits of the global saving glut hypothesis. 
 
2.1 Saving decisions and liquidity creation.  
Bernanke’s thesis strongly influenced economists’ analysis; in many cases it was fully 
accepted,
8 in other cases the global saving glut is considered an important factor together 
with others, in particular with the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve.
9 Bernanke’s 
                                                 
7 As well as Bernanke (2010) see, for example:  Gleaser, Gottlieb, Gyourko (2010), Dokko, Doyle, Kiley, 
Kim, Sherlund, Sim, Van den Heuvel (2009) 
8 Ferguson for instance states that: “Cautious  after  years  of  instability and unused  to the panoply of credit 
facilities we have in the West, Chinese households save an unusually high proportion of their rising incomes, 
in market contrast to Americans, who in recent years have saved almost none at all. Chinese corporations 
save an even larger proportion of their soaring profits. So plentiful are savings that, for the first time in 
centuries, the direction of capital flow is now not from West to East, but from East to West….Welcome to 
the wonderful dual county of ‘Chimerica’ –China plus America-…For a time it seemed like a marriage made 
in heaven. The East Chimericans did the savings. The West Chimericans did the spending. Chinese imports 
kept down US inflation. Chinese savings kept down US interest rates. Chinese labour kept down US wage 
costs. As a result, it was remarkably cheap to borrow money and remarkably profitable to run a corporation. 
…The more China was willing to lend to the United States, the more Americans were willing to borrow. 
Chimerica, in other words, was the underlying cause of the surge of banking lending, bond issuance, and new 
derivative contracts that Planet Finance witnessed after 2000. It was the underlying cause of the hedge funds 
population  explosion.  It  was  the  underlying  reason  why  private  equity  partnership  were  able  to  borrow 
money left, right and centre to finance leveraged buyouts. And Chimerica –or the Asian ‘savings glut’, as 
Ben Bernanke called it- was the underlying reason why the US mortgage market was so awash with cash in 
2006 that you could get a 100 per cent mortgage with no income, no job or assets.” (Ferguson 2008, pp. 333-
336). See also, for example: Tatom (2007); Tabellini (2008), Alesina and Giavazzi (2009); Belke and Gros 
(2010); Krugman and Wells (2010). 
9 See for example: Mizen (2008);  Bracke and Fidora (2008);  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009); Mayer -foulkes 
(2009); Gossè (2009); Diamond and Rajan (2009); Rajan (2010);Catte, Cova, Pagano and Visco (2010).    7 
thesis has also been subject to empirical testing: some of these tests confirm its validity 
(Gruber and Kamin 2005; Legg, Prasad and Robinson 2007), while others cast doubts on 
its importance (Brake and Fidora 2008; Laibson and Mollerstrom 2010).   
The  first  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  highlight  the  weakness  of  the  theoretical 
foundation  of  Bernanke’s  thesis.  To  this  end  it  is  useful  to  underline  the  evident  link 
between  the  explanation  of  the  housing  bubble  formulated  by  Bernanke  and  the 
mainstream  macroeconomic  theory  borne  of  the  monetarist  counter-revolution  in  the 
1970s; both use a concept of finance based on the causal sequence according to which 
saving decisions determine the credit supply and thus investment decisions.  
This is a perfectly valid causal sequence if we assume that in the economic system just 
one  good  is  produced  that  can  be  either  consumed  or  invested;  this    hypothesis  is  a 
common thread in the work of classic economists, neoclassicists right up to contemporary 
supporters of the mainstream theory. Smith (1776), for instance, describes the effects of 
saving decisions on the development of the economic system by considering a world in 
which  only  corn  is  produced;  Böhm  Bawerk  (1884)  instead  consider  a  fishermen’s 
economy in which only fish are produced. In these economies saving corresponds to the 
amount of corn or fish produced which is not consumed and that therefore can be used to 
produce  capital  goods  that  will  be  used  to  produce  more  corn  or  fish;  the  saving  is 
constituted, for example, by the amount of corn or fish that is required to pay the workers 
involved in the production of the ploughs or boats. The agents who save may be the same 
ones who decide to build ploughs or boats and in this case credit is absent, or we can 
hypothesise that the agents who save are different from those that invest, and in this case 
the credit phenomenon becomes relevant.
10    
                                                 
10 Böhm-Bawerk provides an effective example regarding a primitive society of fishermen:“Let us imagine ... 
a tribe of people who live by fishing and who are entirely without capital. They catch their fish on the 
seashore by seizing with their bare hands such fish as are stranded in the pools left behind by the receding 
tide. A workman of this tribe catches and consumes 3 fish a day. If he had a boat and net he could catch 30 
fish a day instead of 3. But he cannot construct those implements because their construction would cost him a 
month’s time and labour, and during that interval he would have nothing to live on.” Böhm-Bawerk (1884, 
pp. 280-281. The situation of our fisherman could improve considerably if someone were in a position to 
lend him sufficient fish to keep him alive in the period in which he is building the boat: in this case, due to 
the greater production of fish obtained with the boat, he can undertake to repay the loan and pay a premium 
constituted by the loan interest: “Now someone lends him 90 fish on condition that he promise to pay back 
180 fish one month later. Our man agrees to the transition, provides his subsistence out of the borrowed fish 
for one month and in the meantime constructs a boat and net with which in the following month he catches   8 
In  a  world  where  there  is  a  substantial  dissociation  between  saving  decisions  and 
investment decisions, the task of the financial system is to ensure that the saved resources 
are used for the most productive investments.
11 The dissociation between saving decisions 
and investment decisions gives rise to a flow of  commercial paper issued by debtors and 
accumulated by creditors of the same country or of different countries. If, for example, in 
line with Bernanke’s analysis, we consider two geographical areas, the US and the Asian 
emerging economies, we can conclude that an increase in the propensity to save in Asian 
emerging economies will lead to an excess of corn supply in capital markets which will 
push down interest rates. This will result in American families saving less and investing 
more, giving rise to a US current account deficit and a corresponding current account 
surplus of the Asian emerging economies.  
Mainstream  theory  allows  us  to  identify  the  saving  glut  in  the  Asian  emerging 
economies as the cause of the US current account deficit; however this is not sufficient to 
explain the presence of speculative bubbles and the origin of the financial crises. To this 
end, as we have already noted, it is necessary to explain: i) the presence of markets in 
which financial assets are continuously traded; ii) the presence of a mechanism of liquidity 
creation that can fuel the speculative demand for financial assets. Bernanke takes the first 
point as a given. With regard to the second point, he points out that the saving decisions of 
the Asian emerging economies gave rise to a mass of liquidity, i.e. money, which poured 
into the US financial system, driving interest rates down and housing prices up. He uses 
the terms ‘liquidity’ and ‘money’ to refer to the capital that flows from Asian emerging 
                                                                                                                                                          
900 fish instead of 90. From these he cannot only repay the stipulated amount of 180 fish but also retain a 
sizable net gain for himself.” Böhm-Bawerk (1884, pp. 175-6) 
11 This definition of the function of the financial system is accepted even by non mainstream economists like 
Stiglitz and Weiss, who describe the function of banks by considering an agricultural economy in which the 
object of credit is corn to be used as seed to plant plots of land of different productivity : “The need for credit 
arises from the discrepancy between individual’s resource endowments and investment opportunities. This 
can be seen most simply if we imagine a primitive agricultural economy, where different individuals own 
different plots of land and have different endowments of  seed  with which to plant the land. … The marginal 
return to additional seed on different plots of land may differ markedly. National output can be increased 
enormously if the seed can be reallocated from plots of lands where it has a low marginal product to plots 
where it has a high marginal product. But this requires credit, that is, some farmers will have to get more 
seed than their endowment in return for a promise to repay next period, when the crop is harvested. Banks are 
the  institutions within this society for screening the loan applicants, for determining which plots have really 
high marginal returns, and for monitoring, for ensuring that the seed are actually planted, rather than, say, 
consumed by the borrower in a consuming binge ” (Stiglitz and Wiess 1990, pp. 91-92) 
   9 
economies to the US financial markets; these capital flows are not made up of the corn 
produced by the emerging economies, but of the money accumulated by these countries as 
a  result  of  the  saving  glut.  However,  Bernanke  overlooks  the  fact  that  the  explicit 
consideration of the presence of money creates an insurmountable problem for the GSG 
hypothesis. In fact, the presence of money prevents us from accepting the causal relation 
between saving decisions, credit supply and investment decisions and the definition of the 
nature of the saving and credit phenomena that characterises the mainstream theory.  
In a world without money in which only corn is produced, saving decisions constitute 
the original phenomenon that determines the credit supply and investment decisions. The 
saver is the one who produces the corn and decides to consume only a part of it, therefore 
he  offers  corn  on  the  capital  markets  to  agents  who  use  it  to  produce  more  corn  as 
described in the example of Stiglitz and Weiss (footnote 11). In this world the decisions of 
the producer-saver are at the origin of the causal sequence which determines the supply of 
credit  and  investment  decisions,  but  in  a  world  in  which  money  is  used  this  causal 
sequence is no longer valid.  In this case the corn producer produces corn to meet the 
demand from agents who have money and therefore he sells the corn produced in exchange 
for money.
12 He does not become a saver at the moment when he decides to produce grain 
and to consume just a part of it, but  at the moment in which he sells the corn for money 
and decides to accumulate money. The fact that he is a saver does not mean he is a creditor 
of a specific agent to whom he lent corn, but it means he has purchasing power, obtained 
by selling corn, that can be used in any future moment to buy goods.  
Money transforms savers in to  wealth  owners;  this point is highlighted by Keynes 
when he states that: “… the act of saving implies… a desire for ‘wealth’ as such, that is for 
a potentiality of consuming an unspecified article at an unspecified time.” (Keynes 1936, p. 
211). All this implies that in a world in which money is used the phenomenon of saving 
cannot be defined by considering only the decisions of the corn producer but it is necessary 
to specify the decisions of those who purchase corn in exchange for money. Indeed, the 
decision of the corn producer to become a saver and to accumulate money depends on the 
presence of agents who decide to purchase corn because they have money at their disposal; 
this makes it important to specify the process of money creation.  
If we consider a world composed of two geographical areas, one an economically 
advanced country, the US, and the other of emerging economies, we can assume that the 
                                                 
12 According to the famous aphorism by Clower: “money buys goods and goods buy money but goos do not 
buy goods. “(Clower 1967, p. 5)   10 
trade between the two areas is carried out in the currency of the more developed country, 
i.e. the US dollar. In this case, the accumulation of money by the corn producers of the 
emerging economies cannot only be the result of their decision to produce more corn but it 
is the consequence of the sale of corn to US consumers or entrepreneurs, and the purchase 
of corn by the latter is possible thanks to the availability of dollars. The availability of 
money  to  US  consumers  or  entrepreneurs  thus  constitutes  the  necessary  origin  of  the 
process that determines the symmetrical imbalances in the trade balances of the US and of 
the emerging economies. 
In a world that uses a bank money the money available could consist of the existing 
money or of new money created by the banking system; this money can be used to increase 
consumption  or  investments.  If  the  demand  for  goods  is  met  by  producers  from  the 
developed country there will be no trade imbalance, while if it is met by producers from 
emerging economies there will be a trade imbalance.
13 In the latter case the producers of 
the emerging economies will become savers and thus owners of wealth which is made up 
of the money from the US (dollars); their saving decisions are thus not the cause of the US 
trade imbalance, but rather they are the consequence of the decisions of US consumers and 
firms and of the US financial system. In a world that uses money the saver is not the corn 
producer who loans the unconsumed corn, but he is the c orn producer who satisfies the 
demand for corn from those who  have money at their disposal  and therefore saves by 
accumulating the money received in exchange for the corn sold.  
The presence of money and in particular of a money such as bank money,  not only 
changes the meaning of the concept of saving, but  it also changes the relation between 
saving decisions and credit supply. In a money-less world an excess of saving on the part 
of corn producers from emerging economies translates into an equivalent supply of corn on 
the capital market and therefore in equivalent credit flows to US entrepreneurs; in this case 
the credit phenomenon is independent of the presence of money and banks.   Wicksell, 
Schumpeter and Keynes instead underline that in a world in which b ank money is used, 
there is a close relation between money and credit; banks are not  mere intermediaries that 
lend what they collect since they grant credit by creating money.  The flow of credit is 
                                                 
13 In both cases there will be the same level of investments, savings and money accumulated by savers; in the 
first case the income level of the developed country will be higher than the level  it would reach in the second 
case.   11 
therefore independent of the saving decisions.
14 The fact that the banks liabilities are used 
as a means of payment prevents us from  considering banks as mere intermediaries who 
lend what they collect, and from considering saving decisions as generating the credit 
supply. 
The first conclusion that we can draw is to stress that the explicit consideration of the 
presence  of  money  and  in  particular,  of  bank  money  challenges  Bernanke’s  GSG 
hypothesis that the saving glut in emerging economies gave rise to the mass of liquidity 
that flowed into the US financial markets causing the housing bubble. In a world with 
money, the emerging economies can become savers and therefore accumulate money, only 
selling goods to the developed country, in our case the US. The origin of the mass of 
liquidity accumulated by emerging economies must therefore be identified in the decisions 
of the US financial system which, by creating new money, financed the demand for goods 
which was fulfilled by emerging economies.
15  
As Keynes points out, the presence of money transforms savers into wealth o wners 
who, once they decide how to  allocate their effective  income  between consumption and 
saving, have to face the problem of deciding the composition of their wealth by deciding to 
                                                 
14 Wicksell notes that the presence of bank money  alters the characteristics of the functions of money supply 
and demand. In a world in which money is either metallic money or banknotes issued by the central bank, 
every individual must own a stock of money to finance transactions; therefore, to demand money means to 
accumulate a store of cash. In this case, the functions of money demand and supply are independent: the 
quantity of money in circulation may be different from the quantity of money demanded, and the difference 
between these quantities will cause a variation in the price level, according to the Quantity Theory of Money. 
He points out that in a bank money world, to demand money does not mean to accumulate stores of money, 
but  rather  it  means  demanding  means  of  payments  from  the  banks.  In  this  case  money  becomes  an 
endogenous variable because whoever desires money to purchase goods will be able to obtain it by getting 
into debt with the banks. Wicksell describes the working of a pure credit economy thus: “If we imagine this 
system developed everywhere to such perfection as it can be said to have attained already in the big banking 
centres, by means of cheques and a clearing system, and even somewhat further, then all purchases, and in 
fact all business transactions, could be effected without material coinage simply by means of entries in the 
books of the banks. ... Here the quantity theory seems, at least on the surface of it, to have lost every inch of 
ground, because when ... neither coins nor notes are used in the conduct of business, there is no need for any 
metallic cash holding,... However much ‘money’ is demanded in the banks, they can pay it out without 
danger of insolvency, since they do nothing about it, but enter a few figures in their books to represent a loan 
granted or a deposit withdrawn...supply and demand of money have in short now become one and the same 
thing.” (Wicksell, 1898, pp. 75-76). As regards Keynes and Schumpeter see: Bertocco (2007, 2008, 2009). 
15 These arguments are coherent with: Bibow (2010a, 2010b); Borio and Disyatat (2011).   12 
accumulate  money  or  alternative  financial  instruments.
16  It  is  this  latt er  choice  that 
Bernanke  believes  gave  rise to  the  flows of capital from emerging economies to the 
financial markets of the US, fueling first the dot.com bubble and then the housing bubble.  
The presence of markets in which financial assets  are traded constitutes the second 
element necessary to explain the phenomenon of speculation, the housing bubble and the 
crisis. Bernanke and the mainstream theory do not give any explanation of the presence of 
these markets. In the following pages it will be shown that the mainstream theory is unable 
to  provide  a  meaningful  explanation  of  the  phenomenon  of  speculat ion  and  that  a 
satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon can be elaborated  on the basis of what we 
learn from Keynes and Schumpeter. 
 
2.2 Money, wealth and uncertainty.  
The phenomenon of speculation becomes significant in a world in which the concepts of 
wealth  and  uncertainty  have  greater  weight.  Following  the  theories  of  Keynes  and 
Schumpeter we can show that the presence of a money that has the characteristics of bank 
money is a necessary condition to explain the concepts of wealth, uncertainty and therefore 
the phenomenon of speculation. 
This relation characterises a world in which several goods are produced. In the world 
described by the mainstream theory in which just one good is produced, as in the case of 
corn, it is not possible to define the concept of wealth since the presence of agents willing 
to accumulate unlimited amounts of corn, year after year, is an improbable hypothesis; 
indeed  we  can  reasonably  assume  that  there  is  a  limit  to  the  amount  of  corn  that  an 
individual would wish to own and consume. This does not apply in a multi-good world 
where money is used; as has been recalled in the previous pages, the presence of money 
makes it possible to consider savers as wealth holders, that is to hypothesise the presence 
of individuals willing to accumulate an unlimited amount of purchasing power. In other 
words, the presence of money allows us to assume that the corn producer, who would not 
                                                 
16 “The psychological time-preferences of an individual require two distinct sets of decisions… The first… 
determines for each individual how much of his income he will consume and how much he will reserve in 
some form of command over future consumption. But this decision having been made, there is a further 
decision which awaits him, namely in what form he will hold the command over future consumption which 
he have reserved… Does he want to hold it in the form of immediate, liquid command (i.e. money or its 
equivalent)? Or is he prepared to part with immediate command for a specified or indefinite period, leaving it 
to future market conditions to determine on what terms he can, if necessary, convert deferred command over 
specific goods into immediate command over goods in general?” (Keynes 1936, p.166)   13 
be willing to accumulate wealth in the form of corn, would be willing to accumulate wealth 
in the form of money in a world in which he can use his own wealth at any future time to 
purchase any good.
17  
A  fundamental  point  common  to  the  theories  of  Keynes  and  Schumpeter  is  the 
emphasis on the fact that the presence of a money such as bank money constitutes the 
necessary  condition  to  explain  the  production of  multiple  goods  and  the  dimension  of 
uncertainty. This relation can be defined by specifying the characteristics of investment 
decisions and the relation between investment decisions and money. 
Keynes accuses the classical theory of having overlooked uncertainty and claims that 
this theory  is able to describe only a world without uncertainty, that is an economy in 
which  consumption  decisions  prevail  and  decisions  on  investment  and  wealth 
accumulation, whose results – not predictable in probabilistic terms - are seen in a more or 
less distant future, are absent.
18 Naturally it would be excessive to claim that the classical 
theory describes an economic system based only on consumption decisions; instead, what 
divides  the  classical  theory  from  the  keynesian  theory  is  the  specification  of  the 
characteristics of investment decisions. In the economy described by the classical  theory 
and by the mainstream theory, investments, which correspond to the amount of corn or fish 
allocated for the production of capital goods, are not ma de in conditions of uncertainty 
since the profitability of the investment coincides with the  physical productivity of the 
investment. For example, the cost of the boat corresponds to the quantity of fish required to 
                                                 
17 Keynes distinguishes between two categories of goods: those that are used to satisfy absolute needs and 
those that satisfy relative needs:”... it is true that the needs of human beings may seem to be  insatiable. But 
they  fall into two classes  –those needs  which are absolute in the  sense that  we feel  them  whatever the 
situation of our fellow human beings may be, and those which are relative in the sense that we feel them only 
if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows. Needs of the second class, those 
which satisfy the desire for superiority, may indeed be insatiable; for the higher the general level, the higher 
still are they. But this is not so true of the absolute needs –a point may soon be reached, much sooner perhaps 
than we are all of us aware of, when these needs are satisfied in the sense that we prefer to devote our further 
energies to non-economic purposes.” (Keynes 1931, p. 327) 
18  “The  whole  object  of  the  accumulation  of  wealth  is  to  produce  results,  or  potential  results,  at  a 
comparatively distant, and sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date. Thus the  fact that our knowledge of the 
future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of 
the classical economic theory. This theory might work very well in a world in which economic goods were 
necessarily consumed within a short interval of their being produced. But it requires, I suggest, considerable 
amendment if it is to be applied to a world in which the accumulation of wealth for an indefinitely postponed 
future is an important factor; and the greater the proportionate part played by such wealth accumulation the 
more essential does such amendment become.” Keynes (1937a, p. 113).   14 
pay the workers who build the boat while the proceeds correspond to the greater number of 
fish  that  can  be  caught  with  the  boat;  the  profits  coincide  with  the  surplus,  i.e.  the 
difference between the quantity of the commodity produced and the quantity of the same 
commodity used as an input, and the boat will be built if the surplus is positive. 
What  distinguishes  the  investments  that  characterise  the  economy  described  by 
Keynes is the fact that they are closely associated with the dimension of uncertainty. This 
relationship can be understood if we consider the examples of investment decisions used 
by Keynes: 
 
“Our knowledge of the factors which will govern the yield of an investment some year 
hence is usually very slight and often negligible. If we speak frankly, we have to admit that 
our basis of knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a railway, a copper mine, a 
textile factory, the goodwill of a patent medicine, an Atlantic liner, a building in the City of 
London, amounts to little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years hence.” (Keynes 1936, 
149-50) 
 
The  future  yield  of  a  railway,  a  copper  mine  or  an  Atlantic  liner  are  not  easily 
foreseeable  because they do not coincide with the productivity of some specific productive 
factor such as land or plough in the case of the Smith’s corn economy, or the boat in the 
case of Böhm-Bawerk’s  fishermen’s economy. The investments considered by Keynes 
have the same characteristics as the innovations that are  at the centre of Schumpeter’s 
analysis.  As  is  well  known,  Schumpeter  holds  that  innovations  constitute  the  first 
endogenous  factor  that  brings  about  the  process  of  change  characterising  a  capitalist 
economy. The phenomenon of innovation regards the sphere of production and it may 
consist of the realization of a new product, the introduction of a new productive method or 
the opening of new markets.  
We can consider the investments of the Keynesian entrepreneur as the tool through 
which firms launch new products on the market, or modify the productive process through 
which  the  existing  goods  are  realized,  or  even  open  new  markets;  so  the  Keynesian 
entrepreneur  who  takes  the  investment  decisions  coincides  with  the  Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur who introduces innovations. The presence of investments  and innovations 
gives prominence to the uncertainty dimension. In an economy in which just one good is 
produced, the economic activity coincides and ends with the production of the sole good 
and an entrepreneur makes a new investment, that is he uses part of the corn produced to 
build a new plough, if the marginal productivity of the plough is superior to the quantity of 
corn or fish used to make the investment.    15 
This does not hold when we consider innovations that give rise to the production of 
new goods: in this case the corn producer is not interested in accumulating tons of unsold 
corn in his warehouse, but to obtain a monetary profit from the sale of the corn. In a world 
in  which  multiple  goods  are  produced  the  economic  activity  does  not  end  with  the 
production of goods, but with the sale of what was produced in exchange for money; the 
sale phase is clearly separated from the production phase. This separation allows us to 
explain the relevance of the dimension of uncertainty since the entrepreneur who produces 
the new good is not at all sure that he will be able to sell all of the production and make a 
satisfactory profit because the innovation alters the existing world, making it very difficult 
to predict the reaction of the consumers to the new proposal (Schumpeter 1912, p. 65).  
In order to explain the fact that the presence of bank money constitutes the necessary 
condition  to  highlight  the  dimension  of  uncertainty  we  can  observe    that  both  the 
Keynesian  entrepreneur  and  the  Schumpeterian  innovator-entrepreneur  must  have  the 
resources available to them to carry out their investments; bank money is the tool that 
enables them to obtain these resources. The importance of bank money can be explained 
by recalling that the investments that characterize a monetary economy are very different 
from those that are found, for example, in Smith’s corn economy. In a corn economy to 
invest means to decide not to consume a part of the corn crop in order to produce more 
corn, while in a monetary economy to invest means, for example, to decide to build a 
railway; building a railway would be very difficult without bank money.   
Indeed,  let  us  suppose  that  in  our  corn  economy  an  entrepreneur  emerges  who, 
following his animal spirits, plans to build a railway the construction of which requires the 
employment of a certain number of workers for ten years. Let us further suppose that the 
existing production techniques make it possible to produce a quantity of corn sufficient to 
guarantee  the  survival  of  the  farm  workers  and  those  that  might  be  employed  in  the 
construction of the railway. We can observe that the railway, at least theoretically, could be 
built also in a corn economy; in this case the construction of the railway is financed by the 
corn  producers  who  give  to  our  entrepreneur  the  corn  necessary  to  pay  the  workers 
involved in building the railway. In return, they receive debt claims that will give them, 
when the railway is built, the right to obtain a quantity of corn equal to the amount lent 
during construction plus a premium consisting of the interest. 
There are at least two elements that impede the realization of this credit contract. The 
first is the fact that it is very difficult for corn producers to assess whether the entrepreneur 
who plans to construct the railway will be able to return the loaned capital because the   16 
credit contract necessary to finance the construction of the railway is very different from 
the one that is usually made in a corn economy under which the corn producer gives the 
excess corn over the amount he intends to consume to another producer who will use it to 
produce corn. In this case, given the production technique, it is easy for the creditor to 
calculate the yield of the loaned corn and thus to define the rate of interest to apply to the 
debtor;
19 in the case of the railway this evaluation is much more difficult because there is 
no physical law that makes it possible to calculate how much  corn will be obtained by the 
sale of train tickets starting from the amount of corn used to build the railway. The second 
difficulty concerns the duration of the loan; our entrepreneur will have to find corn 
producers who are willing to wait ten years before obtaining repayment of the loan. 
The construction of the railway becomes easier in a world in which bank money is 
used.  In this case our entrepreneur will have to convince the banks, not the corn producers, 
of the profitability of his project. The banks will finance the construction of the railway by 
creating new money with which our entrepreneur will pay the workers who will then be 
able to buy corn. The corn producers will not have any difficulty in exchanging corn  for 
bank money, which is a perfectly liquid debt claim that can be used as a means of payment 
at any time. Although they do sell corn to the workers involved in building the railway, the 
corn producers are not creditors of our entrepreneur who is instead in debt to the bank, 
which is in turn in debt to those who own bank money.  
These  agents  may  be  the  corn  producers  if  we  assume  that  the  latter  decide  to 
accumulate the money obtained by selling the corn; they can be considered creditors of the 
banks who, in turn, are creditors  of the firms  that made the investments.  This, however, 
does not mean that the savers, i.e. the producers of corn, who accumulate money, are the 
real creditors of the firms and that the banks are only intermediaries who lend  the money 
they raise, as the mainstream theory holds. This is for two reasons.  In the first place, the 
corn producers become savers after having sold the corn to the firms that, in turn, can 
purchase the corn after having got credit from the banks. In a world in which, as Wicksell 
(1898) notes,   capital goods are not exchanged directly but are bought and sold using 
money, saving decisions are a consequence of investment decisions . Secondly, the corn 
producers are not the real creditors of firms since they do not loan anything, but they 
accumulate bank money by selling corn to firms; they would only be creditors if they had 
loaned corn to the firms directly or through the intermediation of the banks. 
                                                 
19 We can recall the example of Stiglitz e Weiss (1990) referred to in footnote 11.   17 
Banks  therefore  carry  out  a  key  role,  they  share  with  the  entrepreneurs  the 
responsibility  of  deciding  which  investments  are  carried  out;  with  their  decisions  they 
influence the development of the economic system; it is a very different role from that of 
mere intermediary that they could perform in a corn economy by facilitating the transfer of 
corn saved to the producers who intend to expand their grain production.  Thus, we can 
maintain that the presence of  bank money, and a well-developed credit market, constitutes 
the necessary condition for the development of an economy in which  many goods are 
produced, investment decisions become  relevant and in which the presence of uncertainty 
becomes an essential factor. Uncertainty is not merely an exogenous dimension, but it 
becomes a factor whose  presence is explained by the spread of bank money. Ultimately, it 
is an economic system in which the presence of money allows us to consider savers as 
accumulators of wealth.  
 
2.3 Money and speculation. 
Once the concepts of wealth and uncertainty are defined, it is possible to describe the 
phenomenon of speculation. In a world in which investments that have the characteristics 
described by Keynes are made, we can justify the presence of markets in which long term 
bonds
20 and shares are traded. Keynes uses the presence of long term bonds to explain a n 
important aspect of the phenomenon of speculation, i.e. speculative demand for money ; 
wealth owners become speculators in that they choose the composition of their wealth 
depending on their forecasts, formulated in conditions of uncertainty, about  prospective 
gains to be made from bonds  which depends on the future value of the rate of interest.
21 
The second type of asset that can be accumulated by savers as an alternative to money 
is shares. Keynes (1936, chapter 12) notes that the spread of shares characterises a phase in 
the development of the modern economy in which the ownership of the firm is divided up 
among many owners who do not directly manage the firm. In this phase markets develop in 
which shares and long term bonds are continuously traded and the figure of the speculator 
                                                 
20 “The entrepreneur when he decides to invest has to be satisfied on two points: firstly, that he can obtain 
sufficient  short-term  finance  during  the  period  of  producing  the  investment;  and  secondly,  that  he  can 
eventually fund his short-term obligations by a long-term issue on satisfactory conditions.” (Keynes 1937b, 
p. 217) 
21 “There is …a necessary condition failing which the existence of a liquidity-preference for money as a 
means of holding wealth could not exist. This necessary condition is the existence of uncertainty as to the 
future of the rate of interest, i.e. as to the complex of rates of interest for varying maturities which will rule at 
future dates.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 168)   18 
emerges alongside that of the entrepreneur. Keynes distinguishes between speculation and 
enterprise by proposing to use:“… the term speculation for the activity of forecasting the 
psychology  of  the  market,  and  the  term  enterprise  for  the  activity  of  forecasting  the 
perspective yield of assets over their whole life…” (Keynes 1936, 158). The objective of 
the speculator is to make a capital gain on the basis of his forecasts about the value that the 
market will assign in the future to the shares and bonds that are continuously traded on the 
financial markets.
22  
Thus, the phenomenon of speculation is closely linked to the presence of a money 
such as bank money that, as we have seen, makes it possible to highlight the concepts of 
wealth, investment decisions, innovation, uncertainty,  an economic system that Keynes 
defines as a monetary economy.
23 In the absence of these elements it is not possible to 
justify the existence of markets in which speculative bubbles, and therefore financial crises 
such as that of the subprime mortgages, occur.   
These considerations allow us to underline the weakness of the explanations of the 
phenomenon of speculative bubbles based on the mainstream theory; an important example 
of these explanations is found in the work of Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008), who 
elaborated a model that attributes  trade imbalances  of the US (U) and the emerging 
economies  (R)  to  the  failure  of  the  emerging  economies  (R)  to  produce  financial 
instruments that meet savers’ preferences. According to this view, the cause of the trade 
                                                 
22  “Decisions  to  invest  in  private  business  of  the  old-fashioned  type  were,  however,  decisions  largely 
irrevocable, not only for the community as a whole, but also for the individual. With the separation between 
ownership  and  management  which  prevails  to-day  and  with  the  development  of  organized  investment 
markets, a new factor of great importance has entered in… In the absence of security markets, there is no 
object in frequently attempting to revalue an investment to which we are committed. But the Stock Exchange 
revalues  many  investments every day and the revaluations give a frequent opportunity  to the individual 
(though not to the community as a whole) to revise his commitments. It is as though a farmer, having tapped 
his barometer after breakfast, could decide to remove his capital from the farming business between 10 and 
11 in the morning and reconsider whether he should return to it later in the week.” (Keynes 1936, p. 150-151)  
23 Keynes defines a  monetary economy in this way: : “An economy which uses money but uses it merely as a 
neutral link between transactions in real things and real assets and does not allow it to enter into motives or 
decisions,  might  be  called..  a  real-exchange  economy.  The  theory  which  I  desiderate  would  deal,  in 
contradistinction to this, with an economy in which money plays a part of its own and affects motives and 
decisions and is, in short, one of the operative factors in the situation, so that the course of events cannot be 
predicted, either in the long period or in the short, without a knowledge of the behaviour of money between 
the first state and the last. And it is this which we ought to mean when we speak of a monetary economy.” 
(Keynes 1933, 408-9)   19 
imbalance  between  U  and  R  is  the  deterioration  in  the  financial  system  in  R  that  the 
authors describe:  
 
“… as the realization that local financial instruments are less sound than they were once 
perceived to be. This could result from, inter alia, a crash in a bubble; the realization that 
corporate governance is less benign than once thought; a significant  loss of informed and 
intermediation  capital; the sudden perception –justified or not- of ‘crony capitalism’; or a 
sharp decline in property rights protection.” (Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas 2008, p. 367) 
 
Bernanke (2011) points out that this work is coherent with his analysis and constitutes 
the basis for elaborating a more refined version of the GSG hypothesis.
24 The presence of 
an  underdeveloped  financial system led emerging markets not to use the accumulated 
liquidity to finance internal investments, but to use it to purchase lower risk financial assets 
offered by the more developed financial system. This flow of liquidity caused a decline in 
the interest rates  on the less risky assets and led   the financial system to addr ess this 
demand with the offer of new financial instruments created by exp anding the supply of 
hightly rated securities.
25  
The weak point  in  the work of Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas is to assume as a 
given the presence of financial markets developed in a single-good world.
26 If in U and in 
R the same good is produced, for example corn, then the financial instruments that can be 
traded are those that represent the loan of corn or the  ownership of capital goods such as 
ploughs or tractors.  It is difficult to imagine that these financial instruments can have 
different characteristics depending on whether they are issued in one country or in another 
since in a single-good world there is no uncertainty about the future results of the  use of 
corn or of ploughs and tractors.  
 
                                                 
24 “… whereas the GSC hypothesis is based on a simple framework in which global saving and investment 
decisions  determined  the  return  of  a  single  asset,  we  now  consider  how  demands  for  a  range  of  assets 
interacted with supplies of those assets to help produce declines in certain key interest rates.”  (Bernanke 
2011, p. 14).   
25 “Given the strength of demand for safe US assets, it would have been surprising had there not been a 
corresponding increase in their supply… the desire to accommodate the demand for safe assets by global 
investors  was a prominent  factor in a process that transformed risky loans into highly rated securities.” 
(Bernanke 2011, p. 22)  
26 Caballero, Fahri and Gourcinchas (2008) elaborate their analysis by presenting a model in which  a single 
good is produced: “The only saving vehicles are identical ‘trees’ producing an aggregate dividend of δXt per 
unit of  time… whose value at time t is Vt.” (Caballero, Fahri and Gourcinchas (2008), p. 362). The same 
criticism can be levelled at the work of Martin and Ventura (2011).   20 
3. Speculative bubbles and financial crises. 
 
The lesson of Wicksell, Schumpeter and Keynes allows us to underline that an economy 
that uses a money such as bank money has the characteristics that makes it possible to 
elaborate a satisfactory explanation of the speculative bubbles and the financial crises. In 
the  first  place,  the  explicit  consideration  of  the  presence  of  a    bank  money  makes  it 
possible to easily define a process of liquidity creation, independent from saving decisions, 
which    enables  us  to  show  that  savings  decisions  are  a  consequence  of  investment 
decisions. Secondly, as we have seen, the presence of a money such as bank money allows 
us  to  explain  the  phenomenon  of  speculation  and  the  existence  of  markets  in  which 
financial assets are traded.  
The housing bubble did not arise out of the excess of saving but as a result of a series 
of factors that triggered a strong increase in the demand for housing: i) the expansionary 
monetary policy adopted by the Federal Reserve after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and adopted 
by many other industrialised countries; ii) the behaviour of the financial system and in 
particular of the banking system; iii) the expectations of speculators . Many analyses other 
than that of Taylor (2007, 2009) point out that the policy of low interest rates adopted from 
2001 contributed significantly to drive up the demand for housing, causing prices to rise 
and facilitating the spread of speculative expectations of further rises; often these analyses 
consider the monetary policy and the GSG as complementary factors.
27 Also Bernanke in 
more recent papers recognised  that the origin of the crisis must be attributed to a series of 
factors  including,  in  addition  to  the  GSG:  “…  the  originate-to-distribute-model  for 
mortgage  loans,  deteriorating  lending  standard,  deficiencies  in  risk  management, 
conflicting  incentives  for  government-sponsored  enterprises…  and  shortcomings  of 
                                                 
27 “By supporting domestic demand, the expansionary US monetary (and fiscal)  stance contributed to an 
unsustainable  widening  of  the  US  external  deficit,  matched  by  growing  surpluses  in  major  emerging 
economies…. A significant build-up of official reserves occurred in a contest of relatively sluggish growth in 
domestic  demand  and,  especially  in  China,  of  saving  rates  even  higher  than  the  elevated  rates  of  fixed 
investment. Oil-producing countries also recorded surging trade surpluses, as oil prices were driven up by the 
expansion of global demand. … A number of Asian and oil-exporting countries that pegged their countries to 
the dollar accumulated very substantial official reserves….Low interest rates triggered a search for yield, 
which squeezed risk premia as long-term rates declined significantly more than the expected future profile of 
short-term  rates.  This  tended  to  make  financial  conditions  even  more  favourable  for  a  broad  range  of 
borrowers. Low perceived risk, abundant liquidity and credit expansion, as well as regulatory failures in 
some markets, helped feed the house price bubble.”  (Catte, Cova; Pagano and Visco 2010, pp. 11-13; see 
also: Bracke and Fidora 2008; Mizen 2008; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009; Mayer-Foulkes 2009)   21 
supervision and regulation were the primary sources of the US housing boom and bust and 
the associated financial crisis.” (Bernanke 2011, p.13) This list, understandably, excludes 
US  monetary  policy,  but  it  includes  a  series  of  relevant  factors.  In  particular,  it  is 
significant that Bernanke attributes to the banking system the responsibility for having 
increased the supply of subprime mortgages and he links the expansion in the supply of 
credit from the banking system with the spread of the originate-to-distribute model.
28  
These considerations about the responsibility of the banking system become important 
only if we consider a  monetary economy in which the credit supply is independent of 
saving  decisions;  it  is  a  profoundly  different  economy  from  the  one  described  by  the 
mainstream theory to which it is possible to apply the concept of saving and the causal 
relation between saving decisions and investment decisions with the GSG hypothesis and 
with the classical theory of the interest rate. Bernanke tries to overcome this contradiction 
by distinguishing between the real long term interest rate which he believes is determined 
by saving and investment decisions and the short term rate which instead is controlled by 
the monetary authorities.
29 This distinction recalls that between the natural rate of interest 
and the rate of interest on money formulated by Wicksell, who considered the rate of 
interest on money as the price of money in a world in which a bank money is used.  By 
introducing this distinction Wicksell intends to underline that the use of a bank money does 
not change the structure of the economic system which remains that which characterises a 
world in which the capital market coincides with the credit markets and capital was lent in 
kind, since the  only consequence of a discrepancy between the two rates of interest 
concerns the rate of inflation.  
In contrast to Wicksell, Keynes and Schumpeter maintain that the use of a money that 
has the characteristics of a bank money changes radically the structur e of the economic 
system; as we have seen, the presence of bank money allows us to highlight concepts of 
wealth, investment decisions, innovation and uncertainty that have no meaning in a world 
in which only one good is produced and the rate of interest is  determined by investment 
decisions and saving decisions. For this reason Keynes and Schumpeter underline the 
                                                 
28 According to the empirical analysis elaborated by Mian and Sufi (2009), the principal factor that explains 
the growth in subprime mortgages is the large increase in the credit supply from the banking system. 
29 The same approach seems to have been followed in works in which monetary policy and the global saving 
glut are considered as complimentary factors in explaining the bubble; see for example: Obstfeld and Rogoff 
2009.   22 
monetary nature of the rate of interest and they abandon the concept of the natural rate of 
interest.
30  
Many economists have maintained that the banks were driven-pushed into expanding 
the supply  of credit as they underestimated the ris k
31  or overestimated the effects of 
financial innovation:  “  …many  banks  illuded  themselves  into  thinking  that  they  had 
insulated themselves from risk while in actual fact they remained exposed. ” (Alesina and 
Giavazzi, 2008, p. 40). These observations, found in many analyses, seem reasonable; but 
in actual fact, they are difficult to reconcile with the mainstream theory and with the GSG 
hypothesis. If, as the mainstream theory holds, the task of the banks is to allocate in an 
optimal way the saved resources, and hence, to use the example of Stiglitz and Weiss 
(quoted in footnote 11), to ensure that the saved corn is used by whoever owns the most 
fertile land, then it would be difficult to think of an underestimation of the risk by the 
banks and of crises triggered by their errors of evaluation.  
To interpret the statements of Tabellini (2009), Alesina and Giavazzi (2008), we must 
use  a  fundamental  element  of  Keynes’s  analysis:  the  dimension  of  uncertainty  that 
characterises a world in which several  goods are produced, in which the link between 
investment decisions and innovations and the phenomenon of speculation is relevant. In 
                                                 
30 “In my Treatise on Money I defined what purported to be a unique rate of interest, which I called the 
natural rate of interest – namely, the rate of interest which, in the terminology of my Treatise preserved 
equality between the rate of saving (as there defined) and the rate of investment. I believed this to be a 
development and clarification of Wicksell’s ‘natural rate of interest’… I am now no longer of the opinion 
that the concept of a ‘natural’ rate of interest, which previously seemed to me a most promising idea, has 
anything  very  useful  or  significant  to  contribute  to  our  analysis.”  (Keynes  1936,  pp.  242-3)  likewise, 
Schumpeter states that: “The necessity of reconciling a nonmonetary theory with obvious facts of the sphere 
of money and credit is, in particular, responsible for the idea that there are two kinds of interest rates, a 
‘natural’ or ‘real’ one which would also exist in a barter economy and which represents the essence of the 
phenomenon,  a  permanent  net  return  from  physical  means  of  production,  and  a  monetary  one,  which 
fundamentally is but the former’s reflex in the monetary sphere…The roots of this idea reach very far into the 
past...Its role in the thought of our own time is due to the teaching of Knut Wicksell…For us, however, there 
is no such thing as a real rate of interest, except in the same sense in which we speak of real wages…the 
money market with all that happens in it acquires for us a much deeper significance than can be attributed to 
it from the standpoint just glanced at. It becomes the heart, although it never becomes the brain, of the 
capitalist organism.” (Schumpeter 1939, p.101) 
31 “Without doubt the crisis revealed a serious failure of the most sophisticated markets in the world, the 
modern financial markets. A crucial task of financial markets is the allocation of risk. The financial sector 
failed utterly to do this. The risk was underestimated and many intermediaries took on an excessive amount 
of it.” (Tabellini, 7/05/2009)    23 
this case also the banks act in conditions of uncertainty when they evaluate whether or not 
they  should  finance,  for  instance,  the  construction  of  a  railway,  or  when  they  finance 
speculators. The presence of uncertainty leads us to consider the crises as an endogenous 
phenomenon and, paradoxically, that is exactly the conclusion of Alesina and Giavazzi: 
“… crises are an endogenous characteristic of capitalism…capitalism means taking risks; 
rules that make impossible,  or too costly, the taking of risks would be the negation of 
capitalism…” (Alesina and Giavazzi,2008,  pp. 52-55). As explained in the previous pages, 
this is a conclusion that can be justified only if we abandon the mainstream approach that 





The first result of this paper is to show that the GSG hypothesis elaborated by Bernanke 
does not satisfactorily explain the financial crises arising out of housing bubble. In fact, we 
have seen that the GSG hypothesis can only be applied to a world in which the conditions 
necessary for the creation of speculative bubbles do not exist.  
The second result is to show on the basis of the lessons of Wicksell, Schumpeter and 
Keynes that the necessary conditions for the formation of speculative bubbles are present 
in what Keynes defines as a monetary economy characterised by the presence of a bank 
money.  The  presence  of  bank  money  allows  us,  first,  to  define  a  process  of  liquidity 
creation  independent  of  saving  decisions  and,  second,  it  allows  us  to  explain  the 
phenomenon of speculation  and the existence of markets  in  which  financial  assets  are 
traded.  
The analysis presented in these pages enables us to highlight that: i) the accumulation 
of financial resources by emerging countries and the consequent trade balance surplus are 
not  the  cause  of  the  housing  bubble,  but  the  consequence  of  the  decision  of  the  US 
financial system to expand credit to households and firms; ii) the responsibility of the 
financial system for the crisis was not that it was not able to ‘recycle’ savings in an orderly 
way, but rather that it financed, by creating new money and mobilising the existing money, 
economic operations made by agents who did not obtain sufficient  yields to repay the 
loans,  whether  these  were  firms  that  intended  to  make  productive  investments,  or 
individuals who asked for financing to buy real estate or speculators who gambled on the 
continuous rise in housing prices.    24 
References 
Alesina, A. and Giavazzi, F., 2008.  La crisi. Può la politica salvare il mondo?, Il saggiatore, 
Milano.  
Belke, A. and Gros, D., 2010. Global liquidity, world savings glut and global policy coordination, 
DIW Discussion Papers, 973. 
Bernanke, B. 2005. The global saving glut and the U.S. current account deficit, Sandridge Lecture, 
March 10, 2005. 
Bernanke, B. 2007. Global imbalances: recent developments and prospects, Bundesbank lecture, 
September 11, 2007. 
Bernanke, B. 2010. Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, January 
3, 2010. 
Bernanke, B. 2011. International capital flows and the return to safe assets in the United States. 
Financial Stability Review, Banque of France, n. 15, pp.13- 26. 
Bertocco, G., 2007. The characteristics of a monetary economy: a Keynes-Schumpeter approach, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 31, 1, pp.101-122. 
Bertocco, G.,  2008. Finance and development: is Schumpeter’s analysis still relevant?, Journal of 
Banking & Finance, vol. 32, 6, pp. 1161-1175. 
Bertocco,  G.,  2009.,  The  economics  of  financing  firms:  two  different  approaches,  History  of 
Economic Ideas, vol. XVII, 1, pp.85-123. 
Bibow, J., 2010a. Global imbalances, the U.S. dollar, and how the crisis at the core of Global 
finance spread to ‘self-insuring’ emerging market economies, Levy Economics Institute Working 
Papers, n. 591, March 2010. 
Bibow, J. 2010b. Bretton Woods is dead, long live Bretton Wood 3?, Levy Economics Institute 
Working Papers, n. 597, May 2010. 
Böhm-Bawerk, E., 1884. The problem of interest, in Capital and Interest,  reprinted in: Bliss, C., 
Cohen, A. and Harcourt, G. (eds.) Capital Theory, Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Borio, C. and Disyatat, P., 2011. Global imbalances and financial crisis: link or no link?,  BIS 
Working Papers, n. 346, May 2011. 
Bracke, T. and Fedora, M., 2008. Global liquidity glut or global saving glut? A structural VAR 
approach, European Central Bank Working Papers Series, n. 911, June 2008. 
Brunnermeier, M. 2008. Bubbles, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by Durlauf, 
S. and Blum, L. 2
nd Edition, Palgrave. 
Caballero, R., Farhi, E., and Gourinchas, P., 2008. An equilibrium model of ‘global imbalances’ 
and low interest rates, American Economic Review, vol. 98, 1, pp.358-393.  
Catte, P., Cova P., Pagano, P. and Visco. I.,  2010. The role of macroeconomic policies in the 
global crisis, Questioni di Economia e Finanza. Occasional Papers, 69, July, Banca d’Italia. 
Clower,  R.,  1969.  A  reconsideration  of  the  microfoundations  of  monetary  theory,  Western 
Economic Journal, vol. 6, pp. 1-9. 
Diamond,  D.,  and  Rajan,  R.,  2009.  The  credit  crisis:  conjectures  about  causes  and  remedies, 
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, vol. 99, 2, pp. 606-610. 
Dokko, J., Doyle, B., Kiley, M., Kim, J., Sherlund, S., Sim, J., and Van den Heuvel, S.,  2009. 
Monetary  policy  and  the  housing  bubble,  Finance  and  Discussion  Series,  Federal  Reserve 
Board, 2009-49. 
Ferguson, N. 2008. The Ascent of Money. A Financial History of the World. The Penguin Press, 
New York. 
Galbraith, J., 1990. A Short History of Financial Euphoria. Financial Genius is Before the Fall, 
Whittle Direct Book, Knoxville. 
Glaeser, E., Gottlieb, J., and Gyourko, J., 2010. Can cheap credit explain the housing bubble?, July 
28, unpublished paper. 
Gossé, J-B., 2009. The real and financial implications of the global saving glut: a three-country 
model, Hal-00380417, version 2, 26 august. 
Gruber,  J.  and  Kamin,  S.,  2005.  Explaining  the  global  pattern  of  current  account  imbalances, 
International Finance discussion Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, n. 
846, November.   25 
Keynes, J.M., 1973a (1931).  Economic possibilities for our grandchildren, in: J.M. Keynes, The 
Collected Writings, London, Macmillan Press,  vol. IX, 321-332.   
Keynes,  J.  M.,  (1973a  [1933]).  The  distinction  between  a  co-operative  economy  and  an 
entrepreneur economy,  in: J.M. Keynes, The Collected Writings,   Macmillan, London, vol. 
XXIX, pp.76-106. 
Keynes, J.M., 1973c (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, in: J.M. 
Keynes, The Collected Writings , London,  Macmillan Press,  vol. VII  
Keynes,  J.M.,  1973d  (1937a).  The  general  theory  of  employment,    The  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics,  in: J.M. Keynes, The Collected Writings, London, Macmillan Press,  vol.  XIV, 
109-123. 
Keynes, J.M., 1973e (1937b).  The 'ex ante' theory of the rate of interest,  The Economic Journal,  
in: J.M. Keynes, The Collected Writings, London,  Macmillan Press,  vol. XIV,  215-223. 
Kindleberger, C., 1978. Manias, Panics, and Crashes. A History of Financial Crisis, Basis Books. 
Krugman, P. and Wells, R., 2010. The slump goes on: why?, The New York Review of Books, 
September, 30.  
Laibson, D., and Mollerstrom, J., 2010. Capital flows, consumption booms and asset bubbles: a 
behavioural alternative to the saving gluts hypothesis, The Economic Journal, 120, May, pp. 
354-374. 
Legg, A., Prasad, N., and Robinson, T., 2007. Global imbalances and the global saving glut. A 
panel data assessment, Research Discussion Papers, Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007-11. 
Martin, A., and Ventura, J., 2011. Theoretical notes on bubbles and the current crisis, Working 
Paper Series, European Central Bank, n. 1348, June. 
Mayer-Foulkes, D., 2009. Long-term fundamentals of the 2008 economic crisis, Global Economy 
journal, vol. 9, 4, pp. 1-23. 
Mian, A., and Sufi, A. 2009. The consequences of mortgage credit expansion: evidence from the 
U.S. mortgage default crisis, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, pp. 1449-1496. 
Minsky, H., 1975., John Maynard Keynes, Columbia University Press, New York. 
Minsky, H., 1982., Can 'It' Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance,  M.E.Sharpe, New 
York. 
Mizen, P., 2008. The credit crunch of 2007-2008: a discussion of the background, market reactions, 
and policy responses, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October 2008, pp. 
531-567. 
Obstfeld,  M.,  and  Rogoff,  K.,  2009.  Global  imbalances  and  the  financial  crisis:  products  of 
common causes, Asia Economic Policy Conference, Asia and the Global Financial crisis, pp. 
131-183. 
Rajan, R., 2010, Fault lines. How hidden fractures still threaten the world economy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton. 
Reinhart, C., and Rogoff, K., 2009.  This time is different. Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, 
Princeton University press, Princeton. 
Schumpeter,  J., 1912 [1934] The Theory of Economic Development, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
Schumpeter, J., 1964 (1939). Business Cycle. A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of 
the Capitalist Process, abridged edition, New York, McGraw Hill. 
Smith A., 1904 [1776], An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
Stiglitz, J., 1990. Symposium on bubbles, journal of Economic perspectives, vol. 4, 2, pp. 13-18. 
Stiglitz, J., and   Weiss,  A.,  1990.  Banks  as  special accountants  and  screening  devices  for the 
allocation of credit”, Greek Economic Review,  85-118. 
Tabellini, G., 2008. L’Italia in Gabbia, EGEA Università bocconi Editore, Milano. 
Tabellini, G., 2009. Idee e regole per il mondo dopo la tempesta. Il Sole 24 Ore, 07-05-2010. 
Tatom, J., 2007. Why have interest rates been so low?, MPRA Paper n. 4113, November. 
Taylor, J., 2007. Housing and monetary policy, in Housing, Housing finance and monetary policy, 
Federal reserve Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City. 
Taylor, J., 2009. Getting Off Track, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford. 
Wicksell, K., 1898. The influence of the rate of interest on commodity prices, in: Wicksell, K. 
Selected Papers on Economic Activity, Augustus M. Kelley Publishers,  New York, 1969. 